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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD R. HOYT AND
MAUDE S. HOYT,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 7919

WASATCH HOMES, INC., a
Utah Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs agree with defendant's statement of facts
e:x,cept in the following particulars:
I. Although plaintiffs did agree to uobtain annex to
city," it should be borne in mind that the undisputed evidence shows that plaintiffs did obtain such annexation
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(R. 21) , and that the buyers were required to obtain the
bond for the improvements, but failed to do so. (R. 22,
30, 36, 38, and and 41) and that they never advised plaintiffs that they were able to furnish a bond (R. 58).
2. Plaintiffs and the purchasers did not decide, approximately two months after the earnest money receipt
and agreement was signed, to draw up a contract as alleged
in defendant's brief, and no such agreement was ever
drawn. They did discuss with Mark Eggertsen some proposals looking to the final consummation of the agreement,
but they came to no meeting of the minds and the discussion was merely preliminary, according to the testimony of Richard R. Hoyt (R. 19), and the memorandum,
Exhibit cc 1," according to the testimony of Mark B. Eggertsen, was merely a ,copy of a memorandum of some
notes made by Eggertsen while the matter was being discussed, and was merely preliminary, and ccthere were too
many indefinite points that we couldn't reduce it to
contract at that time" (R. 34, 35,36 and 38).
3. Beatta C. Johnson, one of the signers as ((purchaser" of the earnest money receipt and agreement,
Exhibit ccA," at all times of the transactions mentioned,
namely between April, 1950 and June 1952, was employed
by the defendant company as a real estate broker. (R. 51
and 52).

4. Exhibit ccz" was prepared and served upon the
buyers long after it became apparent that the parties could
not agree upon the terms or amounts of the payments required to be made, and called for payment of the full
balance of $25,000.00, and not merely the $6,000.00 as
set forth in defendant's statement o£ facts.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
I. The earnest money receipt and agreement (Exhibit HA") is too indefinite and uncertain to constitute
an enforceable agreement, and, therefore, defendant is
not entitled to any commission for the sale of plaintiff's
property.

2. Exhibit ul" was not subscribed by either of the

parties to the said proposed sale and is, therefore, void
under the statute of frauds.
3. The defendant failed to produce purchasers who

were ready, willing and able at any time to purchase the
said property under any terms or conditions agreeable to
the plaintiffs.
4. The plaintiffs at no time accepted the said purchasers, and there was never any meeting of minds between
the said purchasers and the plaintiffs as to the terms or
conditions of the payment of the purchases price of the
said property.

ARGUMENT
Point I

The earnest money receip.t and agreement (Exhibit
rrA") is too indefinite and uncertain to constitute an en-

forceable agreement, and, there/ore, defendant is not
entitled to any commission for the sale of plaintiffs'
property.
The earnest money receipt and agreement (Exhibit
uA") was prepared· on the printed form commonly used
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by real estate brokers to acknowledge receipt of a down
payment on the proposed purchase of real estate. The
printed matter on the form obviously is designed, in part
at least, to protect the real estate agent in his commission.
Hence the provision for payment of said commission in the
printed portion of the form. Despite that fact, however, it
cannot be successfully contended that the agent has earned
a commission unless he has consummated a sale. The said
Exhibit uA" does recite the payment of the $1,000.00 as
earnest money, and the total purchase price of $26,000.00,
and the $6,000.00 within sixty days, but fails to reveal
any information whatever as to how or when the balance
of $19,000.00 shall be paid. The only recital concerning
the said payment is as follows: ccThe balance of the purchase price shall be paid as follows: $6,000.00 when seller
on delivery of deed or final
approves the sale, $
contract of sale which shall be on or before 60 days from
date 19- earnest money receipt made in lieu of formal
contract of purchase incorporating necessary provisions
for the understanding and protection of both buyer and
seller, and terms & conditions contained herein subject
to adjustment agreeable to both parties."; also: ((contract
of sale or instrument of conveyance to be made on the
approved form of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board in the
name of Elmer J. Johnson and Beatta C. Johnson, husband
and wife."
We respectfully submit that upon the basis of such
unsatisfactory and indefinite provisions there did not exist
any meeting of the minds of the parties as to when or how
or in what amounts the said $19,000.00. would be paid.
Such details were without question left for subsequent
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determination, and without such determination there is
no contract. If either the buyers or the sellers attempted
to enforce this agreement they would be powerless to determine what their respective rights or obligations were,
and consequently there would be nothing left to enforce.
In Massie v. Chatom (1912) 163 Cal. 772, 127 P 56,
a broker was held not to be entitled to a commission for
a sale of land by the production of prospective purchasers
who entered into and later repudiated a written memorandum or agreement embodying the terms arrived at
by the parties, where it was not specifically enforceable
on behalf of the owner because it was undisputed by all
that it was not intended to be a contract of sale but a
mere memorandum of price to be used in future negotiations, with the result that, if the agreement upon its
face appeared to be more than such a memorandum it
was the result of a mutual mistake of the parties, neither
of whom could have successfully invoked the aid of a
court of equity for specific performance, each, rather
being entitled to reformation.
An agreement between prospective purchasers of real
estate and the owner, although embodying substantially
the essential terms of sale and the previous negotiations,
cannot be construed to be a binding and enfor.ceable contract if it bears upon its face language, and is made under
circumstances, justifying only the conclusion that it is
tentative and temporary and not intended to serve as the
final contract of sale, and, upon the withdrawal of the
proposed purchasers from the transaction, the broker who
produced them cannot be considered to have earned his
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commission by obtaining purchasers. Folinsbee v. Sawyer
(1898) 157 NY 196, 51 NE 994.
Although the essential terms of a sale of land are
agreed upon between the owner and his broker's customer,
where references to the details of the manner of making
payments of the consideration and other circumstances
attendant upon the negotiations evince an intention of the
parties that the agreement is informal and that a further
agreement is to be entered into, the fact that the informal
agreement is so far insufficient because of the omissions
mentioned as to be incapable of specific enforcement may
be regarded as decisive against recovery of the broker's
claim for a .commission against the owner, in the event
the customer refuses to proceed with the transaction under
a contract listing the property ttfor sale." Measell v.
Baruch ( 1929) 152 Va. 460, 147 SE 203.
A contract or agreement which is incomplete because
it fails to establish mutuality of obligation essential to specific performance, or to impose a binding duty upon the
purchaser, by reason of which that remedy would be ineffectual, does not furnish a basis for the ~claim that a
broker has earned a commission by producing an eligible
purchaser or induced a sale.
In Kampf v. Dreyer ( 1907) 119 App. Div. 134, 1'03
NYS 962, a broker employed uto secure a purchaser," who
brought to the owner of land a person who qbtained from
him a written agreement to sell it, but who made no agreement to buy it, and afterwards· refused· to sign an agreement or take a deed, was held not to be entitled to a
commission.
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And in Yeager v. Kelsey (1891) 46 Minn. 402, 49
NW 199, overruled on another point in Western Land
Asso. v. Banks (1900) 80 Minn. 317,83 NW 192, a broker
was held not to have earned a commission for selling land
for a specified price, to be measured by a stated percentage,
simply by taking a deposit from a prospective purchaser,
without further procuring any instrument obligating him
to purchase, who, after examining the title, refused to
accept a deed of ,conveyance from the owner.
In McKelvy v. Milford (1948, La. App.) 37 So. 2nd
370, a broker was held not to be entitled to a commission
·where property was listed ccfor sale" at an asking price of
$8,500 in cash, purchasers who had only $1,500 to apply
on the price attempted, at the broker's suggestion, to procure an FHA loan secured by a mortgage on the property,
and signed what was referred to as an agreement to purchase but actually amounted only to a memorandum
expressing a consideration of $8,500, ccterms FHA loan
balance cash," and delivered a $500 check described as
earnest money to be applied on the sale price should it be
consummated, and the owner signed the memorandum and
indorsed and delivered to the broker the check, but the
FHA would only grant $5,200.00, whereupon the purchasers being unable to acquire additional cash, notified
all concerned that no further efforts would be made to
acquire the property. The Court considered that the
broker was not entitled to recover a commission under a
provision in the memorandum that it was ccagreed by the
parties to this contract that the commission of (he
(broker) is earned upon the signing of this contract by
both parties to it, and may be deducted from the money
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herein receipted for," especially where the contract was
later cancelled by mutual agreement between the owner
and proposed purchaser because of the latter's financial
inability to purchase, and itself conferred no tangible contractual rights and was not specifically enforceable and
could not be construed as conferring upon the broker any
right to a commission, ccsimply from the signing" thereof,
because the provision, under such circumstances, would
lead to ccabsurd consequences" and was ccunconscionable."
In Mason v. Small (1908) 130 Mo. App. 249, 109
SW 822, the right of a broker to a commission was held
not to be established where his obligation required him to
find a customer who would ex.change real estate for personal property, and he procured such a customer, who
entered into a contract which was not enforceable under
the statute of frauds because of complete failure to give
adequate description of the land which he owned, and the
landowner refused to complete the contract, an enforceable agreement being considered contemplated in order to
prote.ct the principal.
In Kraus v. Campe ( 1946) 328 Ill. App. 37, 65 NE
2d 127, the court held that a prospective purchaser who
failed to complete a purchase of real estate was entitled
to recover a deposit on the purchase price made with a
broker, where it appeared that the owner and prospective
purchaser, through the original efforts of the broker, had
agreed upon the terms and entered into a contract unenforceable because of uncertainty in the description,
which was of such a character and so seriously defe.ctive as
not to permit the introduction of oral or extrinsic evidence
to supplement it, although the failure to complete the
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transaction was attributable to the prospective purchaser's
delay, the theory being that a real-estate broker has not
earned a commission by the negotiation of an unenforceable contract of sale.
In Frischkorn Real Estate Co. v. Hinckley ( 1924)
227 Mich. 399, 198 NW 882, a real estate broker was held
not to be entitled to a commission, although he delivered
$200.00 as a deposit and first payment on the purchase
price of the owner's property and obtained a receipt stating that the price was $23,000.00, $8,000.00, including
the deposit, to constitute a down payment uwhen deal is
closed" the balance to be payable in installments, whereby
the owner agreed to deliver a land contract for the property and close the deal within ten days from receipt of
abstract and not less than thirty days from the date of
the receipt, and to pay the broker a commission ccWhen
deal is closed." When the down payment became due
the purchaser, on whose behalf the broker had paid the
$200.00, informed the owner that she was unable to make
the payment of a further sum, but the prospective purchaser never consummated the transa,ction. The court's
theory was that the broker had not produced a purchaser
ready, able, and willing to make the required down payment and meet the other terms of the contract or preliminary agreement and that the owner did not become liable
for the commission unless the deal was closed uor unless
he refused to close it with a purchaser produced by the
plaintiff ready to comply with the terms of the sale."
In the absence of an express provision otherwise in a
brokerage agreement upon evidence that the principal's
purpose is the construction of an industrial plant and the
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completion of a binding contract containing specified conditions and assurances with respect, inter alia, to certain
financial arrangements required by the principal for its
protection, no liability for a commission arises unless and
until a contract satisfactory to the principal is actually
executed or unless the broker is instrumental in producing
a responsible person who is ready, able, and willing at all
times to enter into a contract conforming to the terms
outlined in the employment of the broker, payment of the
commission, in such a case, being conditioned upon securing for the principal a binding contract and recovery of
a commission being precluded where the broker does not
produce a party who enters into such a contract and furnishes guaranteed notes satisfactory to the principal, pursuant to previous tentative arrangements agreed upon, but
rather fails to meet the conditions, where there is no waiver
of performance, even though the principal, acting upon
the verbal representations of the customer, in anticipation
that the contract will be consummated, incurs expense in
preparation for performance of the contract. J. P. C.
Petroleum Corp. v. Vulcan Steel Tank Corp. (1941, CA
lOth Okla) 118 F 2d 713.
8 Am. Jur. page 1084-1085. Sec. 168: To entitle
a broker to his commissions, he must accomplish what he
undertook to do in his contract of employment, for, as a
rule, nothing short of that is sufficient to constitute a performance upon his part. He is never entitled to compensation for unsuccessful efforts. In every case reference
must be had to the terms of that particular employment in
order to determine whether or not a broker's duties have
been performed....
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Page 1089. Sec. 173 . . . . According to still other
decisions the necessity of having the contract negotiated
reduced to writing depends upon the ultimate result of
the transaction. That is, the broker, at his own risk, has
the option of either securing a binding written contract
from his customer or of producing a person who is not
only then, but at all times thereafter, ready, able, and
willing to carry out the deal in hand.
Page 1092. Sec. 176.... In other words, if the principal does not see fit to modify his original proposals the
broker can lay no claim to his commissions until he produces a person who is ready, able, and willing to accept
the exact terms of his principal. This is true even though
there is but a slight variance between the contract tendered by the broker and that authorized by his employer.
Thus if the person produced by a broker is willing to purchase at the price set by the employer of the latter but
is not willing to pay such price in the exact manner prescribed in the broker's contract of employment the latter
is not entitled to his commissions.
Where, in response to an inquiry by real estate dealer,
owner of reality wrote a letter stating that he would sell
realty for a price stated, ccterms, cash or contract," dealer
had authority to sell realty by contract only upon terms
to be agreed upon and which were satisfactory and acceptable to owner, and dealer was not entitled to a commission
for finding a buyer on contract under terms not acceptable to or confirmed by owner.-White v. Turner, 192
P. 2d 200, 164 Kan. 659.
Broker who merely secures contract obligating purchaser to consummate purchase or forfeit earnest money
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or partial payments is not entitled to commission. Scott
v. Kennedy, 3 P. 2d 907, 152 Okl. 165.
Point II.

Exhibit rr 1" was not subscribed by either of the parties
to the said proposed sale and is, therefore, void under the
statute of frauds.
Defendant, in its point II, alleges that the details of
the agreement between the plaintiffs and the buyers cchad
all been arranged and agreed upon" as evidenced by Exhibit ul." We have pointed out hereinbefore that the indisputable evidence is that Exhibit cc1" was merely a preliminary memorandum of what the parties were discussing
and that both of the said parties had notified Mr. Eggertsen, upon leaving his office, that nothing more should be
done by way of drawing an agreement until they notified
him. Furthermore, Exhibit cc 1" was not subscribed by
anybody and it is, therefore, wholly invalid for any purpose under Section 2 5-5-1 Utah Code Ann. 19 53 (and
33-5-1 Utah Code Ann. 1943).
The case of LeVine v. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109
P. 2, Ann. Cases 1912, C 407, holds that the signature of
the vendor only is sufficient under this statute. In the
instant case not even the vendor signed the memorandum,
and the undisputed evidence is that it was never intended
as anything more than some notes made by Mr. Eggertsen
of a preliminary discussion of terms. It is elementary that
a deficiency in a memorandum cannot be supplied by
parole evidence. ( 49 Am. Juris. 63 6)
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Point III.

The defendant failed to produce purchasers who were
read,y, willing and able at any time to purchase the said
property under any terms or conditions agreeable to the
plaintiffs.
Defendant relies in part upon the general allegation
that the pur.chasers were ready, willing and able to fulfill
their agreement, and that plaintiffs refused to go through
with the agreement.
We again emphasize the fact that the earnest money
receipt and agreement, Exhibit uA," contained absolutely no provisions as to the time or manner of the payment
of the $19,000.00 balance, and that that element of the
proposed agreement, undetermined as it was, was sufficiently vital and important to render the entire agreement
void and unenforceable for lack of certainty and definiteness. Admittedly the parties to the proposed sale did
discuss the said terms, and the proposed buyers did suggest
the transfer of their interest in some property as security
for the payment of said balance, but the record is devoid
of any evidence that the plaintiffs ever accepted such proposal, and in fact the said proposals were rejected as
evidenced by the Notice, Exhibit ccz." Under the terms
of Exhibit uA" it could not be said that the plaintiffs were
obligated to accept any particular part of the $19,000.00
at any certain time nor that they would be obligated to
accept any particular security for the payment of the said
$19,000.00, nor even that they would be obligated to accept the said $19,000.00 in cash, if such a tender had been
made by the buyers. Furthermore, the buyers at no time
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did any more than to offer to pay the $6,000.00, required
to be paid within 60 days, and to discuss or confer concerning the payment of the balance. At no time did the
said pur.chasers tender payment of the full balance of
$19,000.00 in cash. How can it be said that the proposed
purchasers were ready, willing and able to perform when
there is no determination as to what would constitute
performance?
The cases hereinbefore cited under Point I apply with
equal effect to Point III. We further refer to 12 A.L.R.
2d at page 1421 and pages following for additional annotations on the points herein mentioned.
It is elementary, of course, that a real estate broker
is not entitled to a commission for procuring a purchaser
or lessee on terms different than those agreeable or acceptable to the owner. (E. B. Wicks Co. v. Moyle, 103 Utah
554, 137 Pac. 2d 342; White v. Turner, 164 Kan. 659,
192 Pac. 2d 200).
Defendant further contends that failure to consummate the said sale was due to some failure or refusal on
the part of the plaintiffs. We again submit that there is
no evidence in the record of such failure or refusal. It is
clear that unless the failure to secure a purchaser upon the
terms proposed and within the time provided is due to
the negligence, fraud or fault of the owner, a real estate
broker may not recover upon his contract for commisions
(Ford v. Palisades Corp. 101 C.A. 2d 491, 225 Pac. 2d
545).
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Point IV.

The plaintiffs at no time accepted the said purchaser,
and there was never any meeting of minds between the said
purchasers and the plaintiffs as to the terms or conditions
of the payment of the purchase price of the said property.
Defendant contends in his Point III that the fact that
the plaintiffs and the proposed purchasers negotiated in
an attempt to consummate the sale which the defendant
commenced to make proves that the proposed purchaser
was accepted by the plaintiffs.
We again emphasize that the only thing the defendant
did was to obtain Mr. and Mrs. Johnson as prospective
buyers who made a down payment of $1 ,000.00, agreed
to pay $6,000.00 in 60 days and the balance of $19,000.00
in some manner yet to be determined. Surely the fact
that plaintiffs attempted to cooperate in the completion
of the job that the defendant had commenced should not
result in penalizing the plaintiffs to the extent of relieving
the defendants of any further responsibility. The undisputed evidence is that the defendant did nothing further
to consummate the transaction after obtaining Exhibit
HA" other than to make some contacts in an effort to obtain the bond for the purchasers. We submit that the
defendant was not entitled to wash its hands of all responsibility of completing the proposed sale simply because
plaintiffs and the proposed purchasers expended some efforts of their own to assist in completing the sale.
We challenge the defendant to point to any evidence
in the record which shows that the plaintiffs and Mr. and
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Mrs. Johnson ever agreed upon how or when the $19,000.00 would be paid. The citations and references hereinbefore set forth in Point I apply as well to the facts
referred to in Point IV.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the defendant
utterly failed to obtain a buyer who was ready, willing
and able to purchase the property on terms acceptable to
the seller; that unacceptable terms could not be imposed
upon the plaintiffs so as to entitle the defendant to a commission; that the defendant wholly failed to earn any
commission in the transaction, and that it would be unconscionable to permit the defendant to retain the
$1,000.00 paid to it in this transaction; and that the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as awarded by the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
ROMNEY & NELSON

Attorneys far Plaintiffs
and Respondents
212 Kearns Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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